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Social networks with positive and negative links often split into two antagonistic factions.
Examples of such a split abound: revolutionaries versus an old regime, Republicans ver-
sus Democrats, Axis versus Allies during the second world war, or the Western versus
the Eastern bloc during the Cold War. Although this structure, known as social bal-
ance, is well understood, it is not clear how such factions emerge. An earlier model could
explain the formation of such factions if reputations were assumed to be symmetric. We
show this is not the case for non-symmetric reputations, and propose an alternative
model which (almost) always leads to social balance, thereby explaining the tendency of
social networks to split into two factions. In addition, the alternative model may lead
to cooperation when faced with defectors, contrary to the earlier model. The difference
between the two models may be understood in terms of the underlying gossiping mech-
anism: whereas the earlier model assumed that an individual adjusts his opinion about
somebody by gossiping about that person with everybody in the network, we assume
instead that the individual gossips with that person about everybody. It turns out that
the alternative model is able to lead to cooperative behaviour, unlike the previous model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Why do two antagonistic factions emerge so frequently
in social networks? This question was already looming in
the 1940s, when Heider [23] examined triads of individu-
als in networks, and postulated that only balanced triads
are stable. A triad is balanced when friends agree in their
opinion of a third party, while foes disagree, see Fig. 1.
The individuals in an unbalanced triad have an incentive
to adjust their opinions so as to reduce the stress expe-
rienced in such a situation [4]. Once an adjustment is
made, the triad becomes balanced, and the stress disap-
pears.
A decade later, Harary [22] showed that a complete
social network splits in at most two factions if and only if
all its triads are balanced, see also [7]. Such networks are
called (socially) balanced as well. Since then, the focus of
much of the research has been on detecting such factions
in signed networks [10, 51]. Many signed networks show
evidence of social balance, although the split into factions
might not be exact, that is, they are only nearly socially
balanced [14, 27, 30, 50].
What has been lacking until fairly recently, are dy-
namical models that explain how social balance emerges.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse two such models.
One of these models, proposed first in [26], was proved to
exhibit social balance in [32]. However, this was done un-
der a restrictive symmetry assumption for the reputation
matrix. Here, we continue the analysis of this model and
show that it generically does not lead to social balance
when the symmetry assumption is dropped. In contrast,
we propose a second model that is based on a different
underlying gossiping mechanism, and show that it gener-
ically does lead to social balance, even when reputations
are not symmetric.
Balanced
Unbalanced
Two Factions
FIG. 1 Social Balance. The two upper triads are balanced,
while the two lower triads are unbalanced. According to the
structure theorem [22], a complete graph can be split into
(at most) two opposing factions, if and only if all triads are
balanced. This is represented by the coloured matrix on the
right, where blue indicates positive entries, and red negative
entries.
Moreover, there is a natural connection between nega-
tive links and the evolution of cooperation: we consider
positive links as indicating cooperation and negative links
as defection. We will show that our alternative model is
able to lead to cooperation, whereas the earlier model
cannot.
II. EARLIER MODEL
Certain discrete-time, stochastic dynamics have been
investigated [2, 44], but they exhibit so-called jammed
states [31]: no change in the sign of a reputation im-
proves the degree of social balance, as measured by the
total number of balanced triads in the network. A sur-
prisingly simple continuous-time model [26] was proved
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2to converge to social balance for certain symmetric ini-
tial conditions [32]. The authors assume that the social
network is described by a complete graph (everybody is
connected to everybody), with weighted links represent-
ing reputations that change continuously in time. Let X
denote the real-valued matrix of the reputations, so that
Xij represents the opinion i has about j. It is positive
whenever i considers j a friend, and negative if i thinks
of j as an enemy. The network is balanced, if, up to a
possible relabelling of the individuals, the sign structure
of X takes one of two possible block forms:(
+
)
or
(
+ −
− +
)
. (1)
Changes in the reputations are modelled as follows:
X˙ = X2, or X˙ij =
∑
k
XikXkj , (2)
where X˙ denotes the derivative with respect to time of
the matrix X. The idea behind this model is that reputa-
tions are adjusted based on the outcome of a particular
gossiping process. More specifically, suppose that Bob
(individual i) wants to revise his opinion about John (in-
dividual j). Bob then asks everybody else in the network
what they think of John. If one such opinion Xkj has
the same sign as the opinion Bob has about his gossiping
partner, i.e. as Xik, then Bob will increase his opinion
about John. But if these opinions differ in sign, then Bob
will decrease his opinion about John.
The analysis for symmetric initial conditions X(0) =
XT (0) was carried out in [32]: First, X(0) is diagonal-
ized by an orthogonal transformation X(0) = UΛ(0)UT ,
where the columns of U are orthonormal eigenvectors
u1, . . . , un of X(0) so that UU
T = In, and Λ(0) is a diag-
onal matrix whose diagonal entries are the corresponding
real eigenvalues λ1(0) ≥ λ2(0) ≥ · · · ≥ λn(0) ofX(0). Di-
rect substitution of the matrix function UΛ(t)UT shows
that it is the solution of Eq. 2 with initial condition X(0).
Here, Λ(t) is a diagonal matrix, solving the uncoupled
matrix equation Λ˙ = Λ2 with initial condition Λ(0). The
diagonal entries of Λ(t) are obtained by integrating the
scalar first order equations λ˙i = λ
2
i :
λi(t) =
λi(0)
1− λi(0)t , t ∈
{
[0,+∞) if λi(0) ≤ 0
[0, 1/λi(0)) if λi(0) > 0
(3)
Hence, the solution X(t) blows up in finite time if and
only if λ1(0) > 0. Moreover, if λ1(0) > 0 is a sim-
ple eigenvalue, then the solution X(t), normalized by its
Frobenius norm, satisfies:
lim
t→1/λ1(0)
X(t)
|X(t)|F = u1u
T
1 . (4)
Assuming that u1 has no zero entries, and up to a suit-
able permutation of its components, the latter limit takes
one of the forms in Eq. 1. In other words, if the initial
reputation matrix is symmetric and has a simple, pos-
itive eigenvalue, then the normalized reputation matrix
becomes balanced in finite time.
Our first main result is that this conclusion remains
valid for normal initial conditions, i.e. for initial condi-
tions that satisfy the equality X(0)XT (0) = XT (0)X(0),
see SI Theorem 2. Whereas the real eigenvalues behave
similar to the symmetric case, the complex eigenvalues
show circular behaviour, which results in small “bumps”
in the dynamics as shown in Fig. 2 (see Fig. S3 for more
detail). More precisely, if X(0) is normal and if λ1(0)
is a real, positive and simple eigenvalue which is larger
than every other real eigenvalue (if any), then the solu-
tion X(t) of Eq. 2 satisfies Eq. 4. Hence, once again, the
normalized reputation matrix converges to a balanced
state.
Our second main result is that this conclusion does not
carry over to the case where X(0) is not normal, see SI
Theorem 3. This general case is analysed by first trans-
forming X(0) into its real Jordan-canonical form J(0):
X(0) = TJ(0)T−1, where T consists of a basis of (the
real and imaginary parts of) generalized eigenvectors of
X(0). It can then be shown that the solution X(t) of
Eq. 2 is given by TJ(t)T−1, where J(t) solves the matrix
equation J˙ = J2, an equation which can still be solved
explicitly. Hence, X(t) can still be determined. It turns
out that if X(0) has a real, positive and simple eigenvalue
λ1(0) which is larger than every other real eigenvalue (if
any), then the normalized reputation matrix satisfies:
lim
t→1/λ1(0)
X(t)
|X(t)|F =
u1v
T
1
|u1vT1 |F
, (5)
where u1 and v
T
1 are left and right eigenvectors of X(0)
respectively, that correspond to the eigenvalue λ1(0). If
we assume that none of the entries of u1 and v1 are zero,
then we can always find a suitable permutation of the
components of u1 and v1 such that they have the follow-
ing sign structure:
u1 =

+
+
−
−
 and vT1 = (+ − + −)
Consequently, in general, the matrix limit in Eq. 5 has
the sign structure: (
+ − + −
− + − +
)
,
as illustrated in Fig. 2. Clearly, this configuration doesn’t
correspond to social balance any longer.
III. ALTERNATIVE MODEL
Let us briefly reconsider the gossiping process under-
lying model X˙ = X2. In our example of Bob and John,
3i j
k
X˙ = X 2
The link to
be updated.
What does i
think of k?
What does k
think of j?
X (0) t X (t∗)
i j
k
X˙ = XXT
The link to be
updated
What does i
think of k
What does j
think of k
FIG. 2 The two models compared. The first row illustrates what happens generically for the model X˙ = X2, while the
second row displays the results for X˙ = XXT . Each row contains from left to right: (1) an illustration of the model; (2) the
random initial state; (3) the dynamics of the model; and (4) the final state to which the dynamics converge. Blue indicates
positive entries, and red negative entries. Although the first model converges to a rank one matrix, it is not socially balanced.
The second model does converge generically to social balance. The small bumps in the dynamics for X˙ = X2 are due to
complex eigenvalues that show circular behaviour (see Fig. S3).
the following happens. Bob asks others what they think
of John. Bob takes into account what he thinks of the
people he talks to, and adjusts his opinion of John accord-
ingly. An alternative approach is to consider a type of
homophily process [12, 18, 34]: people tend to befriend
people who think alike. When Bob seeks to revise his
opinion of John, he talks to John about everybody else
(instead of talking to everybody else about John). For
example, suppose that Bob likes Alice, but that John
dislikes her. When Bob and John talk about Alice, they
notice they have opposing views about her, and as a re-
sult the relationship between Bob and John deteriorates.
On the other hand, should they share similar opinions
about Alice, their relationship will improve. Thus, our
alternative model for the update law of the reputations
is:
X˙ = XXT , or X˙ij =
∑
k
XikXjk. (6)
Although there apparently is only a subtle difference in
the gossiping processes underlying the models in Eq. 2
and 6, these models turn out to behave quite differently,
as we discuss next.
Our third main result is that for generic initial con-
ditions, the normalized solution of system Eq. 6 con-
verges to a socially balanced state in finite time. To
show this, we decompose the solution X(t) into its sym-
metric and skew-symmetric parts: X(t) = S(t) + A(t),
where S(t) = ST (t) and A(t) = −AT (t). Since X˙ = X˙T ,
the skew-symmetric part remains constant, and therefore
A(t) = A(0) ≡ A0. The symmetric part then obeys the
matrix Riccati differential equation S˙ = (S+A0)(S−A0).
We introduce Z(t) = e−A0tS(t)eA0t to eliminate the lin-
ear terms in this equation, and obtain
Z˙ = Z2 +A0A
T
0 . (7)
The latter matrix Riccati differential equation can be in-
tegrated, yielding the solution Z(t) explicitly, and hence
S(t), as well as X(t), can be calculated.
It turns out that if A0 6= 0, then X(t) always blows up
in finite time. Moreover, using a perturbation argument,
it can be shown there is a dense set of initial conditions
X(0) such that the normalized solution of Eq. 6 converges
to
lim
t→t∗
X(t)
|X(t)|F = ww
T , (8)
for some vector w, as t approaches the blow-up time t∗,
see SI Theorem 5. If w has no zero entries, this implies
that the normalized solution becomes balanced in finite
time. Hence, the alternative model in Eq. 6 generically
evolves to social balance, see Fig. 2.
4C D
C b − c −c
D b 0
Agents either
Cooperate or
Defect
FIG. 3 Prisoner’s Dilemma. Both players have the option
to either Cooperate or Defect. Whenever an agent cooperates,
it costs him c while his partners receives a benefit b > c,
leading to the indicated payoffs.
IV. EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
Positive and negative links have a natural interpreta-
tion in the light of cooperation: positive links indicate co-
operation and negative links indicate defection. There is
then also a natural motivation for the alternative model
in terms of cooperation. Again, suppose Bob wants to
revise his opinion of John. For Bob it is important to
know whether John is cooperative in order to determine
whether he should cooperate with John or not. So, in-
stead of asking Alice whether she has cooperated with
John, Bob would like to know whether John has coop-
erated with her. In other words, Bob is not interested
in Xkj but in Xjk, consistent with Eq. 6, illustrated in
Fig. 2. This is also what is observed in studies on gossip:
it often concerns what others did, not what one thinks of
others [33, 42]
Indeed gossiping seems crucial in explaining the evo-
lution of human cooperation through indirect reci-
procity [39]. It has even been suggested that humans
developed larger brains in order to gossip, so as to con-
trol the problem of cooperation through social interac-
tion [11]. In general, the problem is that if defection
allows individuals to gain more, why then do individu-
als cooperate? This is usually modelled in the form of
a prisoner’s dilemma, in which each agent has the pos-
sibility to give his partner some benefit b at some cost
c < b. So, if an agent’s partner cooperates (he gives the
agent b) but the agent doesn’t cooperate (he doesn’t pay
the cost c) his total payoff will be b. Considering the
other possibilities results in the payoff matrix detailed in
Fig. 3.
Irrespective of the choice of the other player, it is bet-
ter to defect in a single game. Suppose that the second
player cooperates. Then if the first player cooperates he
gains b− c, while if he defects he gains b, so defecting is
preferable. Now suppose that the second player defects.
The first player then has to pay c, but doesn’t have to pay
anything when defecting. So indeed, in a single game, it
is always better to defect, yet the payoff is higher if both
cooperate, whence the dilemma.
In reality, we do observe cooperation, and various
mechanisms for explaining the evolution of cooperation
have been suggested [37], such as kin selection [21, 46],
reciprocity [3] or group selection [54]. Humans have a
tendency however to also cooperate in contexts beyond
kin, group or repeated interactions. It is believed that
some form of indirect reciprocity can explain the breadth
of human cooperation [39]. Whereas in direct reciprocity
the favour is returned by the interaction partner, in indi-
rect reciprocity the favour is returned by somebody else,
which usually involves some reputation. It has been the-
orized that such a mechanism could even form the basis
of morality [1]. Additionally, reputation (and the fear
of losing reputation) seems to play an important role in
maintaining social norms [13, 15, 17].
In general, the idea is the following: agents obtain some
good reputation by helping others, and others help those
with a good reputation. Initially a strategy known as
image scoring was introduced [38]. Shortly after, it was
argued that a different strategy, known as the standing
strategy, should actually perform better [29], although
experiments showed people tend to prefer the simpler
image scoring strategy [35]. This led to more system-
atic studies of how different reputation schemes would
perform [5, 40, 41]. Although much research has been
done on indirect reciprocity, only few theoretical works
actually study how gossiping shapes reputations [36, 52].
Nonetheless, most studies (tacitly) assume that reputa-
tions are shaped through gossip. Additionally, it was ob-
served experimentally that gossiping is an effective mech-
anism for promoting cooperation [43, 47, 48].
Moreover, these reputations are usually considered as
objective. That is, all agents know the reputation Xj of
some agent j, and all agents have the same view of agent
j. Private reputations—so that we have Xij , the reputa-
tion of j in the eyes of i—have usually been considered by
allowing a part of the population to “observe” an inter-
action, and update the reputation accordingly. If too few
agents are allowed to “observe” an interaction, the repu-
tations Xij tend to become uncorrelated and incoherent.
This makes reputation unreliable for deciding whether to
cooperate or defect. The central question thus becomes
how to model private reputations such that they remain
coherent and reliable for deciding whether to cooperate
or not.
Dynamical models of social balance might provide an
answer to this question. Although it allows to have pri-
vate reputations—that is Xij—the dynamics could also
lead to some coherence in the form of social balance. In
addition, it models more explicitly the gossiping process,
commonly suggested to be the foundation upon which
reputations are forged.
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FIG. 4 Evolution of Cooperation. (A) The fixation probability (probability to be the sole surviving species) is higher
for model X˙ = XXT than X˙ = X2. This implies that the model X˙ = XXT is more viable against defectors, and has an
evolutionary advantage compared to X˙ = X2. (B) The point b∗ at which the model X˙ = XXT has an evolutionary advantage
against defectors (i.e. the fixation probability ρ > 1/2) depends on the number of agents n. The condition for the model
X˙ = XXT to defeat defectors can be approximated by b > b∗ = β
√
n, with β ≈ 1.72.
A. Simulation Results
The reputations of the agents are determined by the
dynamics of the two models. We call agents using X˙ =
X2 dynamics type A, and those using X˙ = XXT dy-
namics type B. We assume that agent i cooperates with
j whenever Xij > 0 and defects otherwise. Agents repro-
duce proportional to their fitness, determined by their
payoff. Agents that do well (have a high payoff) have
a higher chance of reproduction, and we are interested
in knowing the probability that a certain type becomes
fixated in the population (i.e. takes over the whole pop-
ulation), known as the fixation probability ρ. All simula-
tions start off with an equal amount of agents, so if some
type wins more often than his initial relative frequency,
it indicates it has an evolutionary advantage. For the
results presented here this comes down to ρ > 1/2. More
details on the simulations are provided in the Materials
and Methods section at the end of the paper.
The results are displayed in Fig. 4 using a normal-
ized cost of c = 1 (the ratio b/c drives the evolutionary
dynamics, see Materials and Methods and [37]). When
directly competing against each other, type B has an evo-
lutionary advantage (its fixation probability ρB > 1/2)
compared to type A, already for relatively small bene-
fits. When each type is playing against defectors (agents
that always defect), type A seems unable to defeat de-
fectors (ρA < 1/2) for any b < 20, while type B performs
quite well against them. When all three types are playing
against each other results are similar (see Fig. S1). When
varying the number of agents, the critical benefit b∗ at
which type B starts to have an evolutionary advantage
changes (i.e. where the fixation probability ρB = 1/2).
For b > b∗ agents using the model X˙ = XXT have a
higher chance to become fixated, while for b < b∗ defec-
tors tend to win. The inequality for type B to have an
evolutionary advantage can be relatively accurately ap-
proximated by b > b∗ = γ
√
n where γ is estimated to
be around γ ≈ 1.72 ± 0.037 (95% confidence interval).
Varying the intensity of selection does not alter the re-
sults qualitatively (see Fig. S2). Summarizing, type B
is able to lead to cooperation and defeats type A. Based
on these results, if a gossiping process evolved during the
course of human history in order to maintain coopera-
tion, the model X˙ = XXT seems more likely to have
evolved than X˙ = X2. For smaller groups a smaller ben-
efit is needed for the model X˙ = XXT to become fixated.
This dependence seems to scale only as
√
n, so that larger
groups only need a marginally larger benefit in order to
develop cooperation.
V. CONCLUSION
To conclude, we have shown that the alternative model
X˙ = XXT generically converges to social balance,
whereas the model X˙ = X2 did not. The current mod-
els exhibit several unrealistic features, we would like to
address: (1) an all-to-all topology; (2) dynamics that
blow-up in finite time; and (3) homogeneity of all agents.
Although most of these issues can be addressed by spec-
ifying different dynamics, the resulting models are much
6more difficult to analyse, thereby limiting our under-
standing. Although the two models are somewhat simple,
they are also tractable, and what we lose in truthfulness,
we gain in deeper insights: in simplicity lies progress.
Our current analysis offers a quite complete understand-
ing, and we hope it provides a stepping stone to more
realistic models, which we would like to analyse in the
future.
The difference between the two models can be under-
stood in terms of gossiping: we assume that people who
wish to revise their opinion about someone talk to that
person about everybody else, while the earlier model as-
sumed that people talk about that person to everybody
else. Both gossiping and social balance are at the cen-
tre of many social phenomena [11, 13, 16, 20], such as
norm maintenance [17], stereotype formation [53] and so-
cial conflict [28]. For example, a classic work [13] on the
established and outsiders found that gossiping was the
fundamental driving force for the maintenance of the co-
hesive network of the established at the exclusion of the
outsiders. Understanding how social balance may emerge
might help to understand the intricacies of these social
phenomena.
Moreover, in light of the evolution of cooperation it
appears that agents using X˙ = XXT dynamics per-
form well against defectors, and have an evolutionary
advantage compared to agents using X˙ = X2 dynamics.
Contrary to other models of indirect reciprocity, not ev-
erybody might end up cooperating with everybody, and
the population may split into two groups. This provides
an interesting connection between social balance theory,
gossiping and the evolution of cooperation. Our results
improve our understanding of gossiping as a mechanism
for group formation and cooperation, and as such con-
tributes to the study of indirect reciprocity.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
In the simulations of the evolution of cooperation, the
dynamics consist of two parts: (1) the interaction dy-
namics within each generation; and (2) the dynamics pre-
scribing how the population evolves from generation to
generation.
A. Interaction Dynamics
We include three possible types of agents in our simu-
lations:
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FIG. S1 Results including type A, B and defectors.
Type A: uses X˙ = X2 dynamics,
Type B: uses X˙ = XXT dynamics, and
Defectors: have trivial reputation dynamics X˙ = 0, with
negative constant reputations.
We can decompose the reputation matrix X(t) accord-
ingly into three parts:
X(t) =
XA(t)XB(t)
XD(t)
 ,
where XA(t) are the reputations of all agents in the eyes
of agents of type A, XB(t) for type B and XD(t) for de-
fectors. The reputations XA(0) and XB(0) are initialized
from a standard Gaussian distribution. The initial repu-
tation for XD(0) will be set to a fixed negative value. To
be clear, XD(0) is the reputation of all other agents in the
eyes of defectors, which is negative initially. The initial
reputation of the defectors themselves is of course not
necessarily negative initially. For the results displayed
here we have used XD(0) = −10, but results remain by
and large the same when varying this parameter, as long
as it remains sufficiently negative.
Since we are dealing with continuous dynamics in this
paper, we assume all agents are involved in infinitesi-
mally short games at each time instance t. Each agent
i may choose to either cooperate or defect with another
agent j, and this decision may vary from one agent to the
next. For agents of type A and type B the decision to
cooperate is based on the reputation: they defect when-
ever Xij(t) ≤ 0 and cooperate whenever Xij(t) > 0. We
define the cooperation matrix C(t) accordingly
Cij(t) =
{
0 if Xij ≤ 0
1 if Xij > 0
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FIG. S2 Results different intensities of selection.
Defectors will simply always defect. Whenever an agent
i cooperates with j the latter receives a payoff of b at
a cost of c to agent i. We integrate this payoff over all
infinitesimally short games from time 0 to time t∗, which
can be represented as
P (g) =
1
n
∫ t∗
0
bC(t)T e− cC(t)edt,
where e = (1, . . . , 1) the vector of all ones for a certain
generation g.
B. Evolutionary Dynamics
We have simulated the evolution of cooperation for
n = 10, 20, . . . , 60 agents, which stays constant through-
out evolution. We consider four different schemes for
initializing the first generation:
pA(0) pB(0) pD(0)
1) Type A vs Type B 1/2 1/2 -
2) Type A vs Defectors 1/2 - 1/2
3) Type B vs Defectors - 1/2 1/2
4) Type A,B and Defectors 1/3 1/3 1/3
Here pA(0),pB(0) and pD(0) are respectively the propor-
tion of agents of type A, type B and defectors in the
first generation. We use the vector Ti(g) ∈ {A,B,D}
to denote the type of agent i in generation g, so that
Ti(g) = A if agent i is a type A player, Ti(g) = B for
a type B player, and Ti(g) = D for a defector. We are
interested in estimating the probability that a single type
takes over the whole population, known as the fixation
probability ρA, ρB and ρD for the three different types.
If a type has no evolutionary advantage, it is said to be
evolutionary neutral, and in that case its fixation prob-
ability is equal to its initial frequency, e.g. for type A
ρA = pA(0).
We will keep the population constant at the initial n,
and simply choose n new agents according to their pay-
off for the next generation. This can be thought of as
choosing n times one of the n agents in the old genera-
tion for reproduction. Let φi denote the probability that
an agent is selected for reproduction, which we define as
φi =
eβPi(g)∑
i e
βPi(g)
.
Since we are only interested in the number of agents of a
certain type, we can also gather all payoffs for the same
type of agents, and write
Φq =
∑
i:Ti(g)=q
φi,
where q ∈ {A,B,D} represents the type of agent. The
probability to select a type A agent, a type B agent or a
defector is then respectively ΦA, ΦB and ΦD. In the next
generation, the probability that agent i is of a specific
type q can then be written as
Pr(Ti(g + 1) = q) = Φq.
This evolutionary mechanism can be seen as a Wright-
Fisher process [19] with fitnesses eβPi(g). It is well known
that this process converges faster than a Moran birth-
death process, since it essentially takes n time steps in a
Moran process to reproduce the effect of one time step in
9a Wright-Fisher process [19]. Because of the high com-
putational costs (solving repeatedly a non-linear system
of differential equations of size n2), this process is prefer-
able.
Higher β signifies higher selective pressure, and leads
to a higher reproduction of those with a high payoff, and
in the case that β → ∞ only those with the maximum
payoff reproduce. On the other hand, for β → 0 this
tends to the uniform distribution φi = 1/n, where payoffs
no longer play any role. We have used β = 0.5 for the low
selective pressure, β = 5 for the high selective pressure,
reported in the SI. For the results in the main text we
have used β = 1.
For an evolutionary neutral selection in where all
Pi(g) = P are effectively the same, β has no effect, and
φi = 1/n. Notice that if we rescale Pi(g) by 1/c so that
the payoff effectively becomes
1
c
Pi(g) =
1
n
∫ t∗
0
b
c
C(t)T e− C(t)edt,
and we rescale β by c, then the reproduction probabilities
remain unchanged. Hence, only the ratio b/c effectively
plays a role up to a rescaling of the intensity of selection.
Since the point at which the evolution is neutral (i.e. ρ
equals the initial proportional frequency), is independent
of β, this point will only depend on the ratio b/c. So, we
normalized the cost c = 1. To verify this, we also ran
additional simulations with different costs, which indeed
gave the same results.
We stop the simulation whenever one of the types be-
comes fixated in the population. With fixation we mean
that all other types have gone extinct, and only a single
type remains. If no type has become fixated after 1,000
generations, we terminate the simulation and count as
winner the most frequent type. This almost never hap-
pens, and the simulation usually stops after a relatively
small number of generations.
In total, we repeat this process 1,000 times for the re-
sults in the main text, and for the low (β = 0.5) and
high (β = 5) selective pressure 100 times. This means
that we run the evolutionary dynamics until one of the
types has become fixated, and we record which type has
“won”. After that, we again start from the first genera-
tion, and run until fixation, and repeat this. Finally, we
calculate how many rounds a type has “won” compared
to the total number of rounds, which yields the fixation
probability ρ.
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Supplementary Information
I. PRELIMINARIES
We investigate matrix differential equations of the form
X˙ = F (X,XT ), where X is a real n×n matrix, and F is
a one of two specific, smooth functions. These functions
are such that it turns out to be advantageous to consider
the dynamics of the symmetric and skew-symmetric parts
of X. Recall that Rn×n = S ⊕ A, where S is the linear
subspace of real symmetric matrices, and A the linear
subspace of skew-symmetric matrices. Thus, given any
X ∈ Rn×n, we can find unique symmetric S ∈ S and
skew-symmetric A ∈ A such that X = S + A. More
explicitly, S = (X+XT )/2 and A = (X−XT )/2. More-
over, using the inner product 〈X,Y 〉 = tr(XY T ), there
holds that
A⊥ = S. (S1)
The norm induced by this inner product is the Frobenius
norm |X|F = (tr(XXT )) 12 . Recall that the Frobenius
norm is unitarily invariant, i.e. if U is orthogonal (i.e.
UUT = In), then
|UXUT |F = |X|F . (S2)
We denote by In the n× n identity matrix, and by Jn a
specific skew symmetric matrix:
Jn =
(
0 In/2
−In/2 0
)
, n even. (S3)
For all other linear algebra related terminology and prop-
erties we refer to [24].
We briefly review two key ingredients of Heider’s
(static) theory on social balance, namely those of a bal-
anced triangle and a balanced network:
Definition 1. A triangle of (not necessarily distinct)
agents i, j and k is called balanced if
XijXikXkj > 0. (S4)
A network is said to be balanced if all triangles of agents
in the network are balanced.
It turns out that a balanced network takes on a specific
structure, in that at most 2 factions emerge, where mem-
bers within each faction have positive opinions about
each other, but members in different factions have nega-
tive opinions about each other. This result is known as
the Structure Theorem [8, 22]:
Theorem 1 (Structure Theorem in [8, 22]). Let X represent
a balanced network. Then up to a permutation of agents,
the matrix X has the following sign structure:(
+
)
or
(
+ −
− +
)
.
Conversely, if, up to permutation, X has one of these
structures, then it represents a balanced network.
Notice that the same theorem holds irrespective of any
permutation of i,j and k in definition 1.
II. EQUATION X˙ = X2
Consider the model studied numerically in [26] and
analysed for symmetric initial conditions in [32]:
X˙ = X2, X(0) = X0, (S5)
where each Xij is real-valued and denotes the opinion
agent i has about agent j. Positive values mean that
agent i thinks favourably about j, whereas negative val-
ues mean that i thinks unfavourably about j. More ex-
plicitly, model S5 can also be written entrywise:
X˙ij =
∑
k
XikXkj . (S6)
The basic question in this context is whether or not the
solutions of S5 evolve towards a state which corresponds
to a balanced network. A minor technical issue is that
the solution X(t) of S5 often blows up in finite time t¯ as
we shall see later. To resolve this problem we investigate
the sign pattern of the matrix limit limt→t¯X(t)/|X(t)|F
instead, and say that the network evolves to a balanced
state, if this matrix limit is balanced.
Normal initial condition
We start by defining
N = {X ∈ Rn×n|XXT = XTX},
the set of real, normal matrices. Notice that if X belongs
to N then so does X2, hence the set N is invariant for
X˙ = X2.
Recall that normal matrices are (block)-diagonalizable
with blocks of size at most 2 by an orthogonal transfor-
mation: if X0 ∈ N , then
UTX0U = Λ0, (S7)
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where Λ0 consists of real 1× 1 scalar blocks Ai and real
2× 2 blocks Bj = αjI2 + βjJ2 with βj 6= 0.
Note that if Λ(t) is the solution to the initial value
problem Λ˙ = Λ2, Λ(0) = Λ0, then X(t) := UΛ(t)U
T is
the solution to Eq. S5. This shows it is sufficient to solve
system S5 in case of scalar X or in case of a specific, 2×2,
normal matrix X. The scalar case is easy to solve: the
solution of x˙ = x2, x(0) = x0, is
x(t) =
x0
1− x0t , (S8)
which is easily verified, so we turn to the 2 × 2 case by
considering:
X˙ = X2, X(0) = αI2 + βJ2, where β > 0. (S9)
Lemma 1. The forward solution X(t) of S9 is defined for
all t ∈ [0,+∞), and
lim
t→+∞X(t) = 0 and limt→+∞
X(t)
|X(t)|F = −
√
2
2
I2.
Proof. Let X0 = S0 +A0, S0 = αI2 and A0 = βJ2 where
J2 is as defined in Eq. S3. Then the solution X(t) of S9
can be decomposed as S(t) +A(t), where
S˙ = S2 +A2, S(0) = S0, (S10)
A˙ = AS + SA, A(0) = A0. (S11)
Note that S10 is a matrix Riccati differential equation
with the property that the set L := {sI2 +aJ2|s, a ∈ R},
is an invariant set under the flow. Therefore it suffices to
solve the scalar Riccati differential equation correspond-
ing to the dynamics of the scalar coefficients s and a:
s˙ = s2 − a2, s(0) = α, (S12)
a˙ = 2as, a(0) = β, (S13)
whose solution is given implicitly by:
s2 +
(
a− 1
2c
)2
=
(
1
2c
)2
if c 6= 0,
where c is an integration constant. So, the orbits form
circles which are centred at (0, 1/2c) and pass through
(0, 0), and by a = 0 if c = 0. The phase portrait of
system S12-S13 is illustrated in Fig. S3.
All solutions (s(t), a(t)) of system S12-S13, not start-
ing on the s-axis, converge to zero as t → +∞, and ap-
proach the origin in the second quadrant for solutions in
the upper-half-plane, and in the third quadrant for solu-
tions in the lower-half-plane. Moreover, since the s-axis
is the tangent line to every circular orbit at the origin,
the slopes a(t)/s(t) converge to 0 along every solution
limt→+∞ a(t)/s(t) = 0. Consequently, the forward solu-
tion X(t) of S9 satisfies:
lim
t→+∞X(t) = limt→+∞ s(t)I2 + a(t)J2 = 0,
0
0
s
a
FIG. S3 Phase portrait of system S12-S13. Circular orbits in
the upper half plane (a > 0) are traversed counter clockwise,
whereas circular orbits in the lower half plane (a < 0) are
traversed clockwise.
and
lim
t→+∞
X(t)
|X(t)|F = −
√
2
2
I2.
Combining the solution for the scalar and 2 × 2 case
yields our main result in the normal case:
Theorem 2. Let X0 ∈ N , and let (U,Λ0) be as in Eq. S7.
Define
t¯i =
{
1/ai if ai > 0
+∞ if ai ≤ 0
for all i = 1, . . . , k,
and let t¯ = mini t¯i. Then the forward solution X(t) of S5
is defined for [0, t¯).
If there is a unique i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that t¯ = t¯i∗ is
finite, then
lim
t→t¯i∗−
X(t)
|X(t)|F = Ui
∗UTi∗ ,
where Ui∗ is the i
∗th column of U , an eigenvector corre-
sponding to eigenvalue ai∗ of X0.
Proof. Consider the initial value problem:
Λ˙ = Λ2, Λ(0) = Λ0.
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Its solution is given by
Λ(t) =

a1
1−a1t . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . ak1−akt 0 . . . 0
0 . . . 0 X1(t) . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 0 . . . Xl(t)

,
where for all j = 1, . . . , l, Xj(t) is the forward solution
of S9, which is defined for all t in [0,+∞), and converges
to 0 as t→ +∞ by Lemma 1.
This clearly shows that Λ(t) is defined in forward time
for t in [0, t¯). Since the solution of S5 is given by X(t) =
UΛ(t)UT , X(t) is also defined in forward time for t in
[0, t¯). It follows from S2 that
X(t)
|X(t)|F = U
Λ(t)
|Λ(t)|F U
T .
If i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , k} is the unique value such that t¯ = t¯i∗ ,
then using S2:
lim
t→t¯∗i
X(t)
|X(t)|F = U limt→t¯∗i
Λ(t)
|Λ(t)|F U
T = Uei∗e
T
i∗U
T = Ui∗U
T
i∗ ,
where ei∗ denotes the i
∗th standard unit basis vector of
Rn.
Theorem 2 provides a sufficient condition guaranteeing
that social balance in the sense of definition 1 is achieved.
If X0 has a simple, positive, real eigenvalue ai∗ , and if
no entry of the eigenvector Ui∗ is zero, then the network
becomes balanced. Indeed, there holds that, up to a per-
mutation of its entries, the sign pattern of the eigenvector
Ui∗ is either:
Ui∗ =
(
+
)
or
(−) =⇒ Ui∗UTi∗ = (+) ,
or
Ui∗ =
(
+
−
)
=⇒ Ui∗UTi∗ =
(
+ −
− +
)
.
In either case, Theorem 1 implies that the normalized
state of the system becomes balanced in finite time.
Generic initial condition
Although Theorem 2 provides a sufficient condition for
the emergence of social balance, it requires that the initial
conditionX0 is normal. But the setN of normal matrices
has measure zero in the set of all real n×n matrices, and
thus the question arises if social balance will arise for
non-normal initial conditions as well. We investigate this
issue here, and will see that generically, social balance is
not achieved.
If X0 is a general real n × n matrix, we can put it
in real Jordan canonical form by means of a similarity
transformation:
X(0) = TΛ0T
−1, TT−1 = In, (S14)
with Λ0 = diag(A1, . . . , Ak, B1, . . . , Bl), where Ai are
real Jordan blocks and
Bj =

Ci I2 . . . 0
0 Ci
. . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Ci
 , Cj = αjI2 + βjJ2, (S15)
with βj 6= 0.
We again observe that if Λ(t) is the solution to the
initial value problem Λ˙ = Λ2, Λ(0) = Λ0, then X(t) :=
TΛ(t)T−1, is the solution to Eq. S5. Again, it is sufficient
to solve system S5 in case of specific block-triangular X
of the form Ai or Bj as in S15. To deal with the first
form Ai, we first we consider more general, triangular
Toeplitz initial conditions:
X(0) =

x1(0) x2(0) · · · xn(0)
0 x1(0)
. . . xn−1(0)
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · x1(0)
 , (S16)
with xi(0) reals, and denote T T =
{X | X is of the form S16}. It turns out that this
is an invariant set for the system, which can be easily
verified by noting that if X belongs to T T , then so does
X2.
Lemma 2. Let X(0) ∈ T T with
xi(0) =

a 6= 0 if i = 1
1 if i = 2
0 otherwise
.
Then the forward solution X(t) of S5 is defined on [0, t∗)
where t∗ = 1/a if a > 0 and on t∗ =∞ if a ≤ 0, belongs
to T T , and satisfies
xi(t) = pi
(
1
1− at
)
, t ∈ [0, t∗),
where each pi(z) is a polynomial of degree i:
pi(z) =
{
az if i = 1
1
ai−2 z
i + · · ·+ ciz2 otherwise
, (S17)
where ci is some real constant, so that pi(z) has no con-
stant or first order terms when i > 1.
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Proof. First note that system S5 can be solved recur-
sively, starting with x1(t), followed by x2(t), x3(t), . . . .
Only the first equation for x1 is nonlinear, whereas the
equations for x2, x3, . . . are linear. To see this, we write
these equations:
x˙i =

x21, if i = 1
(2x1(t))x2, if i = 2
(2x1(t))xi +
∑i−1
k=2 xk(t)xi−(k−1)(t), if i > 2
,
with x1(0) = a, x2(0) = 1 and xi(0) = 0 for i > 2. The
forward solution for x1 is x1(t) =
a
1−at , for t ∈ [0, t∗),
which establishes the result if i = 1. The forward solution
for x2 is: x2(t) =
1
(1−at)2 , for t ∈ [0, t∗), which establishes
the result if i = 2. If i > 2, we obtain the proof by
induction on n. Assume the result holds for i = 1, . . . , n,
for some n ≥ 2, and consider the equation for xn+1.
Using that xn(0) = 0 for n ≥ 2, the solution is given
by:
xn+1(t) = e
∫ t
0
2x1(s)ds
[
0+
∫ t
0
(
n∑
k=2
xk(s)xn−k+2(s)
)
e
∫ s
0
−2x1(τ)dτ ds
]
.
Since e
∫ t
0
2x1(s)ds = x2(t) and thus e
∫ s
0
−2x1(τ)dτ =
1/x2(s), it follows that:
xn+1(t) =
1
(1− at)2
[∫ t
0
( n∑
k=2
pk(1/(1− as))
pn−k+2(1/(1− as))
)
(1− as)2ds
]
.
Since the polynomials appearing in the integral take the
form of Eq. S17, they are all missing first order and con-
stant terms, and thus there follows that
xn+1(t) =
1
(1− at)2
[∫ t
0
( n∑
k=2
1
an−2
1
(1− as)n+2 +
· · ·+ ckcn−k+2 1
(1− as)4
)
(1− as)2ds
]
and so that
xn+1(t) =
1
an−1
1
(1− at)n+1 + · · ·+
cn+1
(1− at)2 , t ∈ [0, t
∗),
where Kn+1 and cn+1 are certain constants (which are
related in some way which is irrelevant for what follows).
This shows that xn+1(t) is indeed of the form pn+1(1/(1−
at)) with pn+1(z) as in S17.
Next we consider equation S5 in case X(0) is a block
triangular Toeplitz initial condition:
X(0) =

B1(0) B2(0) · · · Bn(0)
0 B1(0)
. . . Bn−1(0)
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · B1(0)
 , (S18)
with Bi(0) = αiI2 + βiJ2 with αi, βi ∈ R, and denote
BT T = {X | X is of the form S18}. Again the set BT T
is invariant for system S5. We use this to solve equa-
tion S5 in case X(0) is a real Jordan block corresponding
to a pair of eigenvalues α± jβ.
Lemma 3. Let X(0) ∈ BT T with
Bi(0) =

αI2 + βJ2 if i = 1
I2 if i = 2
0 otherwise
.
Then the forward solution X(t) of S5 is defined on
[0,+∞), and it belongs to BT T .
Proof. Just like in the proof of Proposition 2, we note
that system S5 can be solved recursively, starting with
X1(t), followed by X2(t), X3(t), . . . . Only the first equa-
tion for X1 is nonlinear, whereas the equations for
X2, X3, . . . are linear. To see this, we write these equa-
tions:
X˙i =

X21 , if i = 1
(2X1(t))X2, if i = 2
(2X1(t))Xi +
∑i−1
k=2Xk(t)Xi−(k−1)(t), if i > 2
.
with X1(0) = αI2 + βJ2, X2(0) = I2 and Xi(0) = 0 for
i > 2. Here we have used the fact that X1Xi + XiX1 =
2X1Xi, since any two matrices of the form pI2 + qJ2
commute and the matrices Xi(t) are of this form.
By Lemma 1, the forward solution for X1(t) is defined
for all t in [0,+∞) (and in fact, converges to zero as
t→ +∞).
Since the X1(t) commute for every pair of t’s, the
forward solution for X2(t) is given by [45] X2(t) =
e
∫ t
0
2X1(s)ds, for t ∈ [0,+∞), where this solution exists
for all forward times t because X1(t) is bounded and con-
tinuous. Similarly, the forward solution for Xi(t) when
i > 2, is given by the variation of constants formula:
Xi(t) = X2(t)
[∫ t
0
X−12 (s)
(
i−1∑
k=2
Xk(s)Xi−(k−1)(s)
)
ds
]
,
for t ∈ [0,+∞) when i > 2, where these solutions are
recursively defined for all forward times because the for-
mula only involves integrals of continuous functions.
Combining both results, puts us in a position to state
and prove our main result.
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Theorem 3. Let X(0) ∈ Rn×n and (T,Λ0) as in S14
with S15. Let a1 > a2 ≥ · · · ≥ ak with a1 > 0 a simple
eigenvalue with corresponding right and left-eigenvectors
U1 and V
T
1 respectively:
X(0)U1 = a1U1 and V
T
1 X(0) = a1V
T
1 .
Then the forward solution X(t) of S5 is defined for
[0, 1/a1), and
lim
t→1/a1
X(t)
|X(t)|F =
U1V
T
1
|U1V T1 |F
.
Proof. Consider the initial value problem Λ˙ = Λ2 with
Λ(0) = Λ0, whose solution is given by
Λ(t) = diag(A1(t), . . . , Ak(t), B1(t), . . . , Bl(t)),
where for all i = 1, . . . , k, Ai(t) is the forward solution
of S5 with Ai(0) of the form Ai in S15, which by Lemma
2 is defined for all t ∈ [0, 1/ai). Since a1 > a2 ≥ · · · ≥ ak,
A1(t) blows up first when t→ 1/a1. The matrices Bj(t),
j = 1, . . . , l, are the forward solution of S5 with Bj(0) of
the form Bj in S15, and by Lemma 3, they are defined
for all t in [0,+∞).
This clearly shows that Λ(t) is defined in forward time
for t in [0, 1/a1). Since the solution of S5 is given by
X(t) = TΛ(t)T−1, X(t) is also defined in forward time
for t in [0, 1/a1), and it follows that
lim
t→1/a1
X(t)
|X(t)|F = limt→1/a1
TΛ(t)T−1
|X(t)|F
=
Te1e
T
1 T
−1
|Te1eT1 T−1|F
=
U1V
T
1
|U1V T1 |F
,
where e1 denotes the first standard unit basis vector of
Rn.
Theorem 3 implies that social balance is usually not
achieved when X(0) is an arbitrary real initial condi-
tion. Indeed, if X0 has a simple, positive, real eigenvalue
a1, and if we assume that no entry of the right and left
eigenvectors U1 and V
T
1 are zero (an assumption which
is generically satisfied), then in general, up to a permu-
tation of its entries, the sign patterns of U1 and V
T
1 are:
U1 =

+
+
−
−
 and V T1 = (+ − + −)
implies that
U1V
T
1 =

+ − + −
+ − + −
− + − +
− + − +
 .
Then Theorem 1 implies that the normalized state of the
system does not become balanced in finite time.
This shows that in general, unless X0 is normal (so
that Theorem 2 is applicable), we cannot expect that
social balance will emerge for system S5.
III. EQUATION X˙ = XXT
We now consider
X˙ = XXT , X(0) = X0, (S19)
where again, each Xij denotes the real-valued opinion
agent i has about agent j. As before, for i = j, the value
of Xii is interpreted as a measure of self-esteem of agent
i. We can also write the equations entrywise:
X˙ij =
∑
k
XikXjk. (S20)
As in the case of model X˙ = X2, we split up the
analysis in two parts. First we consider system S19 with
normal initial condition X0, and we shall see that not
all initial conditions lead to the emergence of a balanced
network in this case, in contrast to the behaviour of S5.
Secondly, we will see that for non-normal, generic initial
conditions X0, we typically do get the emergence of social
balance, also contrasting the behaviour of S5.
Normal initial condition
As for the model X˙ = X2 the set N is invariant for
system S19. By using the same diagonalisation as in Eq.
S7, if Λ(t) is the solution to the initial value problem
Λ˙ = ΛΛT , Λ(0) = Λ0, then X(t) := UΛ(t)U
T , is the
solution to Eq. S19. This shows it is sufficient to solve
system S19 in case of scalar X or in case of a specific 2×2
normal matrix X. The scalar case is easy to solve and
follows Eq. S8, so we turn to the 2×2 case by considering
X˙ = XXT , X(0) = αI2 + βJ2, where β 6= 0. (S21)
We define the angle φ as
φ = arctan
(
α
β
)
, φ ∈
(
−pi
2
,
pi
2
)
. (S22)
Lemma 4. Define t¯ as
t¯ =
pi
2β
− φ
β
. (S23)
Then the forward solution X(t) of S21 is:
X(t) = β tan(βt+ φ)I2 + βJ2, t ∈ [0, t¯). (S24)
Moreover,
lim
t→t¯−
X(t) = +∞I2 + βJ2 and lim
t→t¯−
X(t)
|X(t)|F =
√
2
2
I2.
Proof. Let X0 = S0 + A0, S0 = αI2, and A0 = βJ2.
Then the solution X(t) of S21 can be decomposed as
S(t) +A(t), where
S˙ = (S +A)(S −A), S(0) = S0, (S25)
A˙ = 0, A(0) = A0, (S26)
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so A(t) = A0, and reduces to
S˙ = (S +A0)(S −A0), S(0) = S0 (S27)
Note that S27 is a matrix Riccati differential equation
with the property that the line L = {αI2|α ∈ R}, is
an invariant set under the flow. Therefore it suffices
to solve the scalar Riccati differential equation corre-
sponding to the dynamics of the diagonal entries of S:
s˙ = s2 + β2, s(0) = α, whose forward solution is:
s(t) = β tan (βt+ φ) , for t ∈ (0, t¯), where t¯ is given
by S23. Consequently, the forward solution X(t) of S21
is given by: X(t) = S(t) + A0 = β tan(βt + φ)I2 + βJ2,
for t ∈ (0, t¯), and thus limt→t¯−X(t) = +∞I2 + βJ2 and
lim
t→t¯−
X(t)
|X(t)|F =
X(t)√
2|β sec(βt+ φ)| =
√
2
2
I2.
Combining the solution for the 1 × 1 scalar case in
Eq. S8 and Lemma 4 yields our main result:
Theorem 4. Let X0 ∈ N , and let (U,Λ0) be as in Lemma
S7. Define
t¯i =
{
1/ai if ai > 0
+∞ if ai ≤ 0
for all i = 1, . . . , k,
and
t¯j =
pi
2βj
− φj
βj
for all j = 1, . . . , l,
where φj = arctan
(
αj
βj
)
and let t¯ = mini,j{t¯i, t¯j}. Then
the forward solution X(t) of S19 is defined for [0, t¯).
If there is a unique i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that t¯ = t¯i∗ is
finite, then
lim
t→t¯i∗−
X(t)
|X(t)|F = Ui
∗UTi∗ ,
where Ui∗ is the i
∗th column of U , an eigenvector corre-
sponding to eigenvalue ai∗ of X0.
If there is a unique j∗ ∈ {1, . . . , l} such that t¯ = t¯j∗ ,
then
lim
t→t¯j∗−
X(t)
|X(t)|F =
√
2
2
Uj∗U
T
j∗ ,
where Uj∗ is an n × 2 matrix consisting of the two con-
secutive columns of U which correspond to the columns
of the 2× 2 block Bj∗ in Λ0.
Proof. Consider the initial value problem:
Λ˙ = ΛΛT , Λ(0) = Λ0.
By Lemma 4 its solution is given by
Λ(t) =

a1
1−a1t . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . ak1−akt 0 . . . 0
0 . . . 0 X1(t) . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 0 . . . Xl(t)

,
where for all j = 1, . . . , l, Xj(t) is given by the 2 × 2
matrix in S24 with β, φ and t¯ replaced by βj , φj and
t¯j respectively. This clearly shows that Λ(t) is defined in
forward time for t in [0, t¯). Since the solution of S19 is
given by X(t) = UΛ(t)UT , X(t) is also defined in forward
time for t in [0, t¯). It follows from S2 that
X(t)
|X(t)|F = U
Λ(t)
|Λ(t)|F U
T .
If i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , k} is the unique value such that t¯ = t¯i∗ ,
then
lim
t→t¯∗i
X(t)
|X(t)|F = U limt→t¯∗i
Λ(t)
|Λ(t)|F U
T
= Uei∗e
T
i∗U
T = Ui∗U
T
i∗ ,
where ei∗ denotes the i
∗th standard unit basis vector of
Rn.
If j∗ ∈ {1, . . . , l} is the unique value such that t¯ = t¯j∗ ,
then by Lemma 4:
lim
t→t¯∗j
X(t)
|X(t)|F = U limt→t¯∗j
Λ(t)
|Λ(t)|F U
T
=
√
2
2
UEj∗U
T =
√
2
2
Uj∗U
T
j∗ ,
where Ej∗ has exactly two non-zero entries equal to 1 on
the diagonal positions corresponding to the block Bj∗ in
Λ0.
A particular consequence of Theorem 4 is that if X0
has a complex pair of eigenvalues, the solution of S19 al-
ways blows up in finite time, even if all real eigenvalues of
X0 are non-positive. Recall that the solution of S5 blows
up in finite time, if and only if X0 has a positive, real
eigenvalue. Another implication of Theorem 4 is that if
blow-up occurs, it may be due to a real eigenvalue of X0,
or to a complex eigenvalue. In contrast, if the solution
of S5 blows up in finite time, it is necessarily due to a
positive, real eigenvalue, and never to a complex eigen-
value. When the solution of S19 blows up because of
a positive, real eigenvalue of X0, the system will achieve
balance, just as in the case of system S5. If on the other
hand, finite time blow up of S19 is caused by a complex
eigenvalue of X0, we show that in general one cannot ex-
pect to achieve a balanced network. Assume there is a
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unique j∗ such that:
lim
t→t¯∗j−
X(t)
|X(t)|F =
√
2
2
Uj∗U
T
j∗ ,
Assuming that no entry of Uj∗ is zero, the sign pattern
of Uj∗U
T
j∗ , with
U∗j =

p1 q1
p2 −q2
−p3 q3
−p4 −q4

is given by: 
+ ? ? −
? + − ?
? − + ?
− ? ? +
 ,
up to a suitable permutation, where all pi and qi, i =
1, . . . , 4, are entrywise positive vectors, and where
〈p1, q1〉+ 〈p4, q4〉 = 〈p2, q2〉+ 〈p3, q3〉,
because U is an orthogonal matrix. The ? are not en-
tirely arbitrary because Uj∗U
T
j∗ is a symmetric matrix,
but besides that their signs can be arbitrary.
Generic initial condition
Consider
X˙ = XXT , X(0) = X0, (S28)
where X is a real n× n matrix, which is not necessarily
normal.
We first decompose the flow S28 into flows for the
symmetric and skew-symmetric parts of X. Let X =
S + A,X0 = S0 + A0, where S, S0 ∈ S and A,A0 ∈ A
are the unique symmetric and skew-symmetric parts of
X and X0 respectively. If X(t) satisfies S28, then it can
be verified that S(t) and A(t) satisfy the system:
S˙ = (S +A)(S −A), S(0) = 0, (S29)
A˙ = 0, A(0) = A0, (S30)
Consequently, A(t) = A0 for all t, and thus the skew-
symmetric part of the solution X(t) of S28 remains con-
stant and equal to A0. Throughout this subsection we
assume that A0 6= 0, for otherwise X(0) is symmetric,
hence normal, and the results from the previous subsec-
tion apply. It follows that we only need to understand
the dynamics of the symmetric part. Then the solution
X(t) to S28 is given by X(t) = S(t) + A0, where S(t)
solves S29, and in view of S1, there follows by Pythago-
ras’ Theorem that: |X(t)|2F = |S(t)|2F + |A0|2F , and thus
X(t)
|X(t)|F =
S(t) +A0
(|S(t)|2F + |A0|2F )
1
2
. (S31)
Next we shall derive an explicit expression for the so-
lution S(t) of S29. We start by performing a change of
variables:
Sˆ(t) = e−tA0 S(t) etA0 . (S32)
This yields the equation
˙ˆ
S = Sˆ2 −A20, Sˆ(0) = S0. (S33)
We perform a further transformation which diagonal-
izes −A20: Let V be an orthogonal matrix such that
−V TA20V = D2, where D := diag(0, ω1I2, . . . , ωkIk)
where k ≥ 1 (because A0 6= 0) and all ωj > 0 without
loss of generality. Setting
S˜ = V T SˆV, (S34)
and multiplying equation S33 by V on the left, and by
V T on the right, we find that:
˙˜S = S˜2 +D2, S˜(0) = S˜0 := V
TS0V. (S35)
Notice that this is a matrix Riccati differential equation,
a class of equations with specific properties which are
briefly reviewed next.
Consider a general matrix Riccati differential equation:
S˙ = SMS − SL− LTS +N, (S36)
where M = MT ,N = NT and L arbitrary, defined on S.
Associated to this equation is a linear system(
P˙
Q˙
)
= H
(
P
Q
)
, H :=
(
L −M
N −LT
)
, (S37)
where H is a Hamiltonian matrix, i.e. J2nH = (J2nH)
T
holds, where J2n is as defined in Eq. S3. The following
fact is well-known.
Lemma 5. Let
(
P (t)
Q(t)
)
be a solution of S37. Then, pro-
vided that P (t) is non-singular,
S(t) = Q(t)P (t)−1, (S38)
is a solution of S36. Conversely, if S(t) is a solution
of S36, then there exists a solution
(
P (t)
Q(t)
)
of S37 such
that S38 holds, provided that P (t) is non-singular.
Proof. Taking derivatives in S(t)P (t) = Q(t) yields that
S˙ = (Q˙− SP˙ )P−1, and using S37,
S˙ = (NP−LTQ−S(LP−MQ))P−1 = N−LTS−SL+SMS,
showing that S(t) solves S36. For the converse, let S(t)
be a solution of S36. Let
(
P (t)
Q(t)
)
with
(
P (0)
Q(0)
)
=
(
In
S(0)
)
be the solution of S37. Then
d
dt
(
Q(t)P−1(t)
)
=Q˙P−1 −QP−1P˙P−1
=(NP − LTQ)P−1 −QP−1(LP −MQ)P−1
=(QP−1)M(QP−1)− (QP−1)L− LT (QP−1) +N,
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which implies that QP−1 is a solution to S36. Since
S(0) = Q(0)P−1(0), it follows from uniqueness of solu-
tions that S(t) = Q(t)P−1(t).
In other words, in principle we can solve the nonlinear
equation S36 by first solving the linear system S37, and
then use formula S38 to determine the solution of S36.
We carry this out for our particular Riccati equa-
tion S35 which is of the form S36 if M = In, L =
0, N = D2. The corresponding Hamiltonian is H =(
0 −In
D2 0
)
. We partition D in singular and non-singular
parts:
D =
(
0 0
0 D˜
)
, where D˜ :=
ω1I2 . . . 0... . . . ...
0 . . . ωkI2
 ,
where D˜ is positive definite since all ωj > 0. Partitioning
H correspondingly:
H =

0 0 −In−2k 0
0 0 0 −I2k
0 0 0 0
0 D˜2 0 0
 . (S39)
This matrix is then exponentiated to solve system S37:
(
P (t)
Q(t)
)
=

In−2k 0 −tIn−2k 0
0 c 0 −D˜−1s
0 0 In−2k 0
0 D˜s 0 c
(P (0)Q(0)
)
,
where we have introduced the following notation:
s(t) := diag(sin(ω1t)I2, . . . , sin(ωkt)I2) = sin(D˜t),
and similarly c(t) = cos(D˜t). By setting P (0) = In,
and Q(0) = S˜0, and using Lemma 5, it follows that
the solution of the initial value problem S35 is given by
S˜(t) = Q(t)P (t)−1,
(
P (t)
Q(t)
)
=

(
(In−2k − t)S˜0 0
0 c(t)− D˜−1s(t)S˜0
)
(
In−2kS˜0 0
0 D˜s(t) + c(t)S˜0
)
 ,
(S40)
for all t for which P (t) is non-singular. We now make the
following assumption:
Assumption A. The matrix P (t) is non-singular for all
t in [0, t¯), where t¯ is finite and such that s(t) is non-
singular for all t in (0, t¯). Moreover, P (t¯) has rank n−1,
or equivalently, has a simple eigenvalue at zero.
Later we will show that this assumption is generically
satisfied, and also that
t∗ = t¯, (S41)
where [0, t∗) is the maximal forward interval of exis-
tence of the solution S˜(t) of the initial value prob-
lem S35. Consequently, the theory of ODE’s implies that
limt→t¯ |S˜(t)|F = +∞, i.e. that t¯ is the blow-up time for
the solution S˜(t).
Assuming for the moment that assumption A is satis-
fied, back-transformation using S32 and S34, yields that
the solution S(t) of S29 is S(t) = etA0 V S˜(t)V T e−tA0 ,
which is defined for all t in [0, t¯), because etA0 V is
bounded for all t (as it is an orthogonal matrix). It fol-
lows from S2 that
lim
t→t¯
S(t)
|S(t)|F = e
t¯A0 V
(
lim
t→t¯
S˜(t)
|S˜(t)|F
)
V T e−t¯A0 , (S42)
provided that at least one of the two limits exists. Par-
titioning S˜0 in S40 as follows:
S˜0 =
(
(S˜0)11 (S˜0)12
(S˜0)
T
12 (S˜0)22
)
, with
(S˜0)11 = (S˜0)
T
11
(S˜0)22 = (S˜0)
T
22
,
we can rewrite P (t) and Q(t) on the time interval (0, t¯)
as: P (t) = ∆(t)M(t) with,
∆(t) =
(
tIn−2k 0
0 D˜−1s(t)
)
,
and
M(t) =
(
1/t− (S˜0)11 −(S˜0)12
−(S˜0)T12 D˜c(t)s−1(t)− (S˜0)22
)
= MT (t),
and
Q(t) =
(
(S˜0)11 (S˜0)12
c(t)(S˜0)
T
12 D˜s(t) + c(t)(S˜0)22
)
.
Note that the factorization of P (t) is well-defined on (0, t¯)
because by assumption A, the matrix s(t) is non-singular
in the interval (0, t¯). Moreover, assumption A also im-
plies there exists a nonzero vector u corresponding to the
zero eigenvalue of M(t¯), i.e. M(t¯)u = 0, and that u is
uniquely defined up to scalar multiplication because the
zero eigenvalue is simple. More explicitly, partitioning u
as ( u1u2 ), there holds that(
1/t¯− (S˜0)11 −(S˜0)12
−(S˜0)T12 D˜c(t¯)s−1(t¯)− (S˜0)22
)(
u1
u2
)
= 0.
(S43)
Notice that M(t) is at least real-analytic on the inter-
val (0, t¯). Hence, it follows from [25] (see also [6, 49]),
that there is an orthogonal matrix U(t), and a diago-
nal matrix Λ(t), both real-analytic on (0, t¯), such that:
M(t) = U(t)Λ(t)UT (t), for t ∈ (0, t¯), and thus M−1(t) =
U(t)Λ−1(t)UT (t), for t ∈ (0, t¯). Returning to S42, we
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obtain that:
lim
t→t¯
S(t)
|S(t)|F
= et¯A0 V lim
t→t¯
Q(t)U(t)Λ−1(t)UT (t)∆−1(t)
|Q(t)U(t)Λ−1(t)UT (t)∆−1(t)|F V
T e−t¯A0
= et¯A0 V
Q(t¯)uuT∆−1(t)
|Q(t¯)uuT∆−1(t)|F V
T e−t¯A0 .
Here, we have used the fact that M−1(t) is positive def-
inite on the interval (0, t¯), so that its largest eigenvalue
(which is simple for all t < t¯ sufficiently close to t¯, because
of assumption A approaches +∞ -and not −∞- as t→ t¯.
To see this, note that from its definition follows that M(t)
is positive definite for all sufficiently small t > 0, because
D˜ is positive definite. Moreover, M(t) is non-singular on
(0, t¯) since by assumption (A), P (t) is non-singular on
(0, t¯), and because M(t) = ∆−1(t)P (t) (it is clear from
its definition and assumption A that ∆(t) is non-singular
on (0, t¯) as well). Consequently, the smallest eigenvalue
of M(t) remains positive in (0, t¯), as it approaches zero as
t→ t¯. This implies that the largest eigenvalue of M−1(t)
is positive on (0, t¯), and approaches +∞ as t → t¯, as
claimed.
Note that:
Q(t¯)u =
(
(S˜0)11 (S˜0)12
c(t¯)(S˜0)
T
12 D˜s(t¯) + c(t¯)(S˜0)22
)(
u1
u2
)
=
(
(1/t¯)u1
D˜s−1(t¯)u2
)
= ∆−1(t¯)u,
where in the second equality, we used the second row of
S43 , multiplied by c(t¯). From this follows that
lim
t→t¯
S(t)
|S(t)|F = e
t¯A0 V
∆−1(t¯)uuT∆−1(t¯)
|∆−1(t¯)uuT∆−1(t¯)|F V
T e−t¯A0
=
wwT
|wwT |F ,
where w := et¯A0V∆−1(t¯)u.
Taking limits for t → t¯ in S31, and using the above
equality, we finally arrive at the following result, which
implies that system S28 evolves to a socially balanced
state (in normalized sense) when t→ t¯:
Proposition 1. Suppose that assumption A holds and A0 6=
0. Then the solution X(t) of S28 satisfies:
lim
t→t¯
X(t)
|X(t)|F =
wwT
|wwT |F .
with w = et¯A0V∆−1(t¯)u.
Genericity
Generically, assumption A holds, and S41 holds as well.
There are two aspects to assumption A:
1. The matrix P (t) is nonsingular in the interval [0, t¯),
but singular at some finite t¯ such that:
t¯ < min
j=1,...,k
pi
ωj
. (S44)
2. P (t¯) has a simple zero eigenvalue.
To deal with the first item, suppose that the solution
S˜(t) of S35 is defined for all t ∈ [0, t∗) for some finite
positive t∗. By Lemma 5, there exist P (t) and Q(t)
such that S˜(t) = Q(t)P−1(t), where P (t) and Q(t) are
components of the solution of system S37 with H de-
fined in S39. Then necessarily t¯ ≤ t∗. Thus, if we can
show that t∗ < minj pi/ωj , then S44 holds. To show that
t∗ < minj pi/ωj , we rely on a particular property of ma-
trix Riccati differential equations S36: their solutions
preserve the order generated by the cone of non-negative
symmetric matrices, see [9]. More precisely, if S1(t) and
S2(t) are solutions of S36, and if S1(0)  S2(0), then
S1(t)  S2(t), for all t ≥ 0 for which both solutions are
defined. The partial order notation S1(t)  S2(t) means
that the difference S2(t)−S1(t) is a positive semi-definite
matrix.
We apply this to equation S35 with S˜1(0) = αminIn
and S˜2(0) = S˜(0), where we choose αmin as the smallest
eigenvalue of S˜(0) (or equivalently, of S(0) = S0, since
S˜(0) = V TS0V ), so that clearly S˜1(0)  S˜2(0). Conse-
quently, by the monotonicity property of system S35, it
follows that S˜1(t)  S˜(t), as long as both solutions are
defined. We can calculate the blow-up time t∗1 of S˜1(t)
explicitly, and then it follows that t∗ ≤ t∗1, where t∗ is the
blow-up time of S˜(t). Indeed, equations of system S35 de-
couple for an initial condition of the form αminIn, and the
resulting scalar equations are scalar Riccati equations we
have solved before. The blow-up time for S˜1(t) is given
by:
t∗1 =
minj=1,...,k
(
pi
2ωj
− φjωj
)
, if αmin ≤ 0
minj=1,...,k
(
1
αmin
, pi2ωj −
φj
ωj
)
, if αmin > 0
.
with φj := arctan
(
αmin
ωj
)
∈ (−pi2 , pi2 ). Notice that for all
j = 1, . . . , k, there holds that pi2ωj −
φj
ωj
< piωj , because by
definition,
φj
ωj
∈ (− pi2ωj , pi2ωj ). Consequently,
t¯ ≤ t∗ ≤ t∗1 < min
j=1,...,k
pi
ωj
,
which establishes S44. In other words, we have shown
that the first item in assumption A is always satisfied.
The second item in assumption A may fail, but holds
for generic initial conditions as we show next. For this we
first point out that the derivative of each eigenvalue of
M(t) is a strictly decreasing function in the interval (0, t¯),
independently of the value of the matrix S˜0. Indeed, the
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derivative of eigenvalue λj(t) of M(t) equals (see [25]) :
λ˙j(t) = uj(t)
T M˙(t)uj(t)
= −uj(t)T
(
1/t2 0
0 D˜2s−2(t)
)
uj(t),
where uj(t) is the normalized eigenvector of M(t) corre-
sponding to λj(t), and which is analytic in the considered
interval. Since M˙(t) is negative definite in that interval,
λ˙j(t) is also negative and hence all eigenvalues of M(t)
are strictly decreasing functions of t in that interval. Sup-
pose now that M(t) has a multiple eigenvalue 0 at t = t¯,
then M(t¯) is positive semi-definite since t¯ is the first sin-
gular point of M(t) and the eigenvalues are decreasing
function of t. If we now choose a positive semi-definite
∆S˜0 of nullity 1, such that M(t¯) + ∆S˜0 also has nullity
1, then the perturbed initial condition (S˜0)p = S˜0 −∆S˜0
yields the perturbed solution S˜p(t) which can be factored
as Qp(t)P
−1
p (t), and where Pp(t) = ∆(t)Mp(t) (note that
∆(t) remains the same as before the perturbation) for
Mp(t) = M(t) + ∆S˜0 which now has a single root at the
same minimal value t¯. To construct such a matrix ∆S˜0 is
simple since the only condition it needs to satisfy is that
M(t¯) and ∆S˜0 have a common null vector. Those degrees
of freedom show that the second item in assumption A is
indeed generic.
Now that we have established that A generically holds,
we show that S41 is satisfied also. The proof is by con-
tradiction. Earlier, we have shown that t¯ ≤ t∗. Thus,
if we suppose that S41 fails, then necessarily t¯ < t∗.
This implies that although P (t¯) is singular, the solu-
tion S˜(t) exists for t = t¯. Our goal is to show that
limt→t¯ |S˜(t)|F = +∞, which yields the desired contra-
diction (by the theory of ODE’s).
We first claim the following:
If u 6= 0 and P (t¯)u = 0, then Q(t¯)u 6= 0. (S45)
Indeed, if this were not the case, then there would exist
some vector u¯ 6= 0 such that P (t¯)u¯ = 0 and Q(t¯)u¯ = 0.
On the other hand, P (t) and Q(t) are components of the
matrix product (
P (t)
Q(t)
)
= etH
(
In
S˜0
)
,
where H is defined in S39. Multiplying the latter in
t = t¯ by u¯, and using the previous expression, it follows
from the invertibility of et¯H that u¯ = 0, a contradiction.
This establishes S45.
In the previous section, we factored P (t) as P (t) =
∆(t)M(t). Since P (t) is non-singular on [0, t¯), and sin-
gular at t¯, it follows from S44 and the definition of ∆(t),
that M(t) is non-singular (and, in fact, positive definite
as shown in the previous section) on (0, t¯), and singular
at t¯ as well. Therefore, since M(t) is symmetric and real-
analytic, it follows from [25] that we can find a positive
and real-analytic scalar function (t), and a real-analytic
unit vector u(t) such that:
M(t)u(t) = (t)u(t), (t) > 0
on (0, t¯), (t¯) = 0, |u(t)|2 = 1, where |.|2 denotes the
Euclidean norm. In particular, M(t¯)u(t¯) = 0, and since
∆(t¯) is non-singular, it follows that P (t¯)u(t¯) = 0. Then
S45 implies that Q(t¯)u(t¯) 6= 0. Define the real-analytic
unit vector
v(t) =
∆(t)u(t)
|∆(t)u(t)|2 , t ∈ (0, t¯),
and calculate
lim
t→t¯
|S˜(t)v(t)|2 = lim
t→t¯
|Q(t)P−1(t)v(t)|2
=
|Q(t¯)u(t¯)|2
|∆(t¯)u(t¯)|2 limt→t¯
1
(t)
= +∞.
Since for any real n×n matrix A, and for any unit vector
x (i.e. |x|2 = 1) holds that |Ax|2 ≤ |A|F , it follows
that limt→t¯ |S˜(t)|F = +∞. This yields the sought-after
contradiction.
By combining Proposition 1 and the results in this sub-
section, we have proved the main result concerning the
generic emergence of balance for solutions of system S28.
Theorem 5. There exists a dense set of initial conditions
X0 in Rn×n such that the corresponding solution X(t)
of S28 satisfies:
lim
t→t¯
X(t)
|X(t)|F =
wwT
|wwT |F .
with w = et¯A0V∆−1(t¯)u.
Proof. The set of initial conditions X0 for which A0 6= 0
and assumption A holds is dense in Rn×n.
